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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
FAIRVIEW PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., Local 1586, IAFF, 
Respondent, 
-and-
FA-rRVTEW-FTRE DISTRICT
 7 
Charging Party. 
#2A - 12/14/79 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4015 
KENNETH PELUSO, for Respondent 
RAINS & POGREBIN (TERENCE M. O'NEIL, ESQ., 
of Counsel) for Charging Party 
The chargeherein was brought by the Fairview Fire District 
(District) against the Fairview Professional Firefighters Associ-
ation, Inc., Local 1586, I.A.F.F. (Local 1586). It alleges that 
Local 1586 violated its duty to negotiate in good faith by submit-
ting a demand involving a nonmandatory subject of negotiation to 
1 
an interest arbitration panel. The demand is: 
"Vacation rights of supervisory personnel should not 
prevail on vacation rights of firefighters and, in turn, 
vacation rights of firefighters should not prevail on 
supervisory personnel.1:' 
In support of its charge, the District argues that the demand 
is not a mandatory subject of negotiation because it would inter-
im As originally submitted, the charge alleged that Local 1586 had 
improperly submitted several nonmandatory subjects of negotia-
tion to an interest arbitration panel. We processed it under 
§204.4 of our Rules without any report or recommendation from 
a hearing officer because it is one that primarily involves the 
scope of negotiations under the Taylor Law. In 12 PERB 13083, 
we dealt with eight of the demands of Local 1586 that had been 
challenged by the District, but we overlooked one demand. The 
District made a motion for the reopening of the case and Local 
1586 did not object'.' : This supplemental Decision and Order deals 
with the remaining demand. 
Board i^ U-4015 -2 
fere with the District's managerial prerogative of determining its 
staffing needs. It also argues that the demand is vague and can 
be construed to cover non-unit employees. 
We determine that the demand is a mandatory subject of nego-
tiation. This demand would change the method by which rank and 
file firefighters and their supervisors hid for available vacation 
timer andredoes~not"affect:"the^ numhex-^ olE"fxrefrghters^ and^ f^ire 
officers who must be on duty at any time. It is a management 
prerogative for a public employer to determine the number of fire-
fighters and fire officers who must be on duty at any given time. 
Subject to its staffing requirements, however, a public employer is 
required to negotiate as to the manner in which available vacation 
time may be enjoyed by individuals and groups of firemen. In City 
of Yonkers, 10 PERB 1[3056 (1977), we ruled (at p. 3099) that a 
public employer 
"may determine the number of unit employees that it 
must have on duty during each of the vacation periods. 
Within that framework, it is obligated to negotiate 
over the order in which vacation preferences may be 
granted." 
That ruling is applicable here. 
We also reject the District's argument that the demand is 
vague and can be construed to cover non-unit employees. The nego-
tiating unit represented by Local 1586 includes fire officers up 
to and including the rank of captain. Local 1586 contends that 
the "supervisory personnel" referred to in the demand are the cap-
tains and lieutenants included in the unit. In view of the 
presence of such supervisory personnel in the unit, it would be a 
forced and unreasonable interpretation of the demand to hold that 
it applies as well to non-unit personnel. 
Board - U-4015 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge that Local 1586 
improperly insisted upon its vacation 
schedule demand be, and it hereby is, 
DISMISSED. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 13, 1979 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
Qn^gL AJKJC 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Me'mber 
G0b4 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF YONKERS, 
-and 
Employer, * 
MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATION OF THE PAID FIRE : 
-DEPARTMENT^ OF~THE:--ei-TY-OF-YONK-ERS7 -NEW-YORKr--: 
INC., LOCAL 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO, : 
-and 
UNIFORMED FIRE OFFICERS 
PAID FIRE DEPARTMENT OF 
NEW YORK, 
Petitioner, : 
1
 ASSOCIATION OF THE : 
THE CITY OF YONKERS, : 
Intervenor, : 
#2B-12/14/79 
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. C-1823 
IRVING T. BERGMAN, ESQ., for Employer 
BELSON, CONNOLLY & BELSON. for Petitioner 
WEINGARD & BROUDNY, ESQS. for Intervenor 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Mutual Aid 
Association of the Paid Fire Department of- the City of Yonkers , 
New York, Inc., Local 628 (Local 628) petitioner herein, to a 
decision of the Acting Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing its objections to conduct 
affecting the rres:ull.t:s of an election. In the election, which was 
held on February 1, 1979, 27 of 101 valid votes were cast for Local 
628, while 74 valid votes were cast for the Uniformed Fire Officers 
Association of the Paid Fire Department of the City of Yonkers, 
New York (UFOA) . UFOA had been the representative of the unit '• 
members at the time when the petition /was filed and it had-inter-
Board - C-1823 -2 
vened in the proceeding. 
The basis for the objections was certain statements made by 
the president of UFOA before the election that the City of Yonkers 
(City) would withdraw benefits that had been tentatively agreed 
upon by the City and UFOA before the petition was filed if Local 
628 won the election. As late as the day before the election, the 
president of UFOA attributed such a posture to the City. 
-A-fter- ~a-hearing-,- the- Director--determin:e-d-^ ha1r^ the-"att:rrbution" 
of this posture to the City was incorrect and that the City had 
maintained a consistent position of neutrality between the two 
unions. He further determined that there had been a sufficient 
opportunity before the election for Local 628 to respond to the 
UFOA's misrepresentation and that it had, in fact, availed itself 
of this opportunity. He therefore dismissed the objections. . In 
its exceptions, Local 628 argues that there could not have been an 
effective rebuttal of the misrepresentation without the explicit 
corroboration of the City and that the City's refusal to say any-
thing other than that it would bargain in good faith with any 
chosen representative of the employees was not sufficient to 
corroborate the rebuttal. 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the determination of the 
Director. The evidence shows that the president of Local 628 had 
sufficient opportunity before the election to inform unit employees 
that there was no truth to UFOA's statements and that the City's 
treatment of the tentative agreements would be the same whether the 
election were won by petitioner or by the UFOA, and that, in fact, 
he did avail himself of that opportunity. The evidence further 
shows that the vice president of UFOA acknowledged at pre-election 
meetings attended by two-thirds of the unit employees, that the 
Board - C-1823 -3 
City would not change the tentative agreement by reason of the 
outcome of the election. On these facts, we conclude that the 
misrepresentation made by the president of UFOA regarding the posi-
tion of the City on the tentative agreements did not adversely 
affect Local 628's interest and it does not, therefore, require 
the holding of a new election.— 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE DETERMINE that UFOA should be certified 
as the negotiating agent of the employees in 
the unit. 
Dated, Albany, New York 
December 14, 1979 
Harold R. Newman, Chain ^feC airman 
fa/&*?*<• Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Melnber 
— In view of this decision, we do not reach cross-exceptions of 
UFOA in which it asserts that the Director should have dis-
missed the petition on unrelated grounds. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NORTHPORT-EAST NORTHPORT UNION FREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Upon the application for designation 
of persons as. Managerial or Confidential 
#2C - 12/14/79 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER • 
CASE NO. E-0457 
INGERMAN, SMITH, GREENBERG & GROSS (JOHN H. GROSS, ESQ., 
of Counsel) for Employer 
BARATTA & SOLLEDER (BRUNO BARATTA, ESQ., of Counsel) 
for Intervenor 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Northport 
Administrators and Supervisors Association (Association), the inter 
venor herein, to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) that six employees of the 
Northport-East Northport Union Free School District (District) are 
1 
managerial employees. The six employees have been in a negoti-
ating unit represented by the intervenor. 
In support of its exceptions, the Association contends that 
the Director erred in determining that the six employees are mana-
gerial because they formulate policy. The exceptions simply raise 
1 The six employees are: 
Larry McNally 
Peter Michel 
Robert Kruger 
Irene Taylor 
David Jackier 
Robert Silverman 
Director, Pupil Personnel Services, 
Research and Evaluation 
Director, Physical Education and 
Athletics 
Director of Music 
Director, Continuing Education and 
Recreation 
Director of Art and Multi-media 
Director of Industrial Arts and Home 
Economics • 
6068 
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a question of fact. Citing our decision in State of New York, 
5 PERB 1f300l (1972), the Association states that a person formu-
lates policy if he "participates with regularity in the essential 
process which results in a policy procedure." It argues, however, 
that the record is barren of evidence that any of the six employees 
does so. According to the Association, they are resource personnel 
who function in a technical, rather than in a managerial, capacity. 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the conclusion of the 
Director that each of the six employees does participate regularly 
in the process which results in the adoption of educational policy. 
Each of the employees is a director of district-wide programs con-
2 
cerned with the staff teaching of elective courses. The directors 
formulate policy proposals involving curriculum and other educa-
tional matters in the areas in which they function. Their propo-
sals are routinely accepted. These activities fall within the 
statutory standard in §201.7(a) of the Taylor Law for the desig-
nation of persons who formulate policy as managerial employees. 
Accordingly, 
WE AFFIRM the decision of the Director, and 
WE ORDER that the following individuals be, and they hereby 
are, designated managerial: 
2 The District's Assistant Superintendent for Instruction is 
responsible for the teaching of the core courses. In this 
responsibility, he is assisted by department chairpersons. 
G063 
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Larry McNally 
Peter Michel 
Robert Kruger 
Irene Taylor 
David Jackier 
Robert Silverman 
Director, Pupil Personnel Services, 
Research and Evaluation 
Director, Physical Education and 
Athletics 
Director of Music 
Director, Continuing Education and 
.Recreation 
Director of Art and Multi-media 
Director of Industrial Arts and 
Home Economics. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 14, 1979 
'Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
.vid C. Randies, MeMbe Davi rfb r 
eo?o 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of : 
#2D - 12/14/79 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, INC., : 
Respondent, : BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
- and - : 
Case No. U-3740 
MORRIS ESON, ••-•:--
Charging Party. ' : 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESQ., (ROCCO A„ 
SOLIMANDO, ESQ., and IVOR R. MOSKOWITZ, 
ESQ., of Counsel) for Respondent 
MORRIS ESON, p_ro se 
The charge herein was filed by Morris Eson on December 18, 
1978. It alleges that United University Professions, Inc0 (UUP) 
violated Section 209-a.2(a) of the Taylor Law by interfering with 
his right not to join UUP and by coercing him into doing so. The 
basis of the charge is that UUP is providing insurance benefits 
solely to its members out of agency shop fee payments collected 
from him. 
• FACTS 
Eson, an employee of the State of New York, is a member of 
the State University Professional Services negotiating unit but 
he is not a member of UUP, the exclusive representative of the 
employees in that unit. As authorized by Section 208.3 of the 
Taylor Law, UUP is collecting an agency shop fee from Eson. That 
section of the Taylor Law, which was enacted in 1977, provides 
6071 
eo?. 
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that agency shop fee payments may be collected from a non-member 
in an amount equivalent to that levied by the employee organiza-
tion as "dues", provided that the employee organization has 
established and is maintaining a proper refund procedure.— Such 
a refund procedure must provide for the return to an employee who 
seeks it, the "pro rata share of expenditures by the organization 
in aid of activities or causes of a political or ideological 
nature only incidentally related to terms and conditions of 
employment." 
The statutory authorization of agency shop fees is a depar-
ture from the general provisions of the Taylor Law as specified in 
Section 202. Ever since the enactment of the Taylor Law in 1967, 
that section has provided that a public employee has a right "to 
refrain from forming, joining or participating in, any employee 
organization . . .". 
UUP set its dues as a percentage of salary, with a maximum 
annual fee of $250.00. Part of the dues and agency shop fee 
income goes into the general fund of UUP, the balance going to 
UUP's state and national affiliates. UUP provides various insur-
ance policies to its members, but not to employees who make agency 
2/ 
shop fee payments.— The premiums for these policies are paid 
—'In a related case, we found that the refund procedure establish-
ed- by UUP was defective in certain particulars and we required 
certain changes (11 PERB 1f3068) . An amended refund procedure 
was approved (11 PERB 1(3074) , but we have since determined that 
the refund procedure is not being maintained properly because 
its appellate steps are not being accomplished in an expeditious 
manner. UUP has until January 31, 1980 to complete all steps 
relating to Eson's application for a refund (12 PERB 113093). 
2/ 
— With respect to a group life insurance policy, UUP has been 
advised by the State Insurance Department that it cannot provide 
this policy to non-members. The same may be true with respect 
to the major medical and accidental death or dismemberment 
policies. 
U-3740 
-3-
from monies in the general fund. Thus, some of the money collec-
ted from Eson as an agency shop fee goes to purchase insurance 
policies for UUP members for which he is not eligible. 
The Hearing Officer's Decision 
The hearing officer dismissed the charge. He determined 
that the money collected from Eson as an agency shop fee was. 
equivalent to dues and that the amount of the fee was, therefore, 
sanctioned by statute. He found no basis for excluding monies 
collected by UUP for deposit in its general fund from the term 
"dues" even though some of it would be used to purchase insurance 
policies for members only. 
The hearing officer also addressed the question of the right 
of UUP to require Eson to pay, in part, for the insurance poli-
cies of its members, and he concluded that it could not do so* 
In support of this, he cited the opinion of the Supreme Court in 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 95 LRRM 2411 
(1977), for the proposition that agency shop fee payments are 
constitutional only insofar as they are used to "finance expendi-
tures by the union for the purpose of collective bargaining, 
3/ contract administration, and grievance adjustment."—' 
The hearing officer concluded that UUP is required to refund 
to Eson his pro rata share of the money paid into the general fund 
that was used to purchase insurance policies for members, and that 
the refund appeals procedure established by UUP is the only 
remedy available to Eson for that purpose. 
^See the Abood decision at 431 US at pp. 226-7, 95 LREM at 
p. 2417. 
U-3740 -4-
Exceptiohs 
Both Eson and UUP have filed exceptions to the hearing 
officer's decision. Eson argues that the hearing officer erred 
in dismissing his charge of coercion because he interpreted the 
term "dues" too broadly. According to Eson, the insurance poli-
cies provided to UUP members constituted a partial rebate of 
Jtheir dues, thus in fact reducing the - amount: of dues that -they . _. 
paid. Consequently, the refusal of UUP to provide an equivalent 
rebate to non-members means that their agency shop fee exceeded 
the dues paid by members. 
For its part, UUP takes exception to the dictum of the 
hearing officer that, at some future time, it will have to refund 
to Eson a pro rata share of the monies spent on insurance policies 
for members. It argues that Section 208.3 of the Taylor Law 
requires a refund which represents only "the employee's pro rata 
share of expenditures by the organization in aid of activities or 
causes of a political or ideologicaT nature only incidentally 
related to terms and conditions of employment" .("emphasis supplied). 
As the money spent on insurance policies is neither of a politic 
cal nor ideological nature, it is not covered by the statutory 
refund procedure. 
• DISCUSSION 
We reverse the hearing officer and sustain the charge, We 
find that UUP, by using Eson's agency shop fee payments to secure 
insurance benefits solely for members of UUP, has acted in a 
manner which interferes with, restrains, and coerces him in the 
exercise of his right not to join or participate in UUP, in 
6074 
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violation of CSL §209-a.2(a).-^ 
The general principle established by the Taylor Law (§202) 
is that a public employee has the right "to refrain from forming, 
joining, or participating in any employee organization . . .". 
Civil Service Law §208.3, added in 1977, states that "notwith-
standing" such principle, agency fee payments may be required. 
This section of the Taylor Law compels employees to make payments 
to the employee organization that represents them. Their payment 
of the agency shop fee is an act of participation in the organi-
zation. To that extent only, the statute requires participation 
in the employee organization. Civil Service Law §208.3 does not 
authorize other pressure or participation otherwise prohibited by 
CSL §§202 and 209-a.2(a). Other separate and independent acts of 
coercion are not authorized by the agency shop legislation. By 
placing the non-member in the position of having to join the 
union or forego the substantial economic benefit for which he is 
paying, UUP commits a separate and independent act of coercion. 
Furthermore, the duties of an employee organization which is 
the exclusive representative of a negotiating unit of employees 
". . . extend beyond the mere representation of the interest of 
its own group members. By its selection as bargaining represen-
tative, it has become the agent of all of the employees, charged 
with the responsibility of representing their interests fairly 
—In so holding, it is not necessary to determine what the 
Legislature intended by the term "dues" as used in CSL §208.3. 
Nor are we required to interpret the phrase "political or 
ideological" found in the same section. For the purposes of 
this improper practice charge it is sufficient that the avail-
ability of the refund procedure mandated by that section does 
not permit UUP to continue to expend its funds in the coercive 
and discriminatory manner disclosed in this case. 
6075 
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5/ 
and impartially."— A union may breach this, duty of. fair repre-
sentation "by arbitrary or irrational conduct even in the absence 
of bad faith or hostility ...".— We have long held that this 
duty exists under the Taylor Law and a violation of that duty is 
an improper practice within the meaning of §209-a„2(a) of the 
Act.— We conclude that a parallel duty exists under the Taylor 
Law to protect the agency fee payer from discriminatory use of 
his funds by his collective bargaining representative„ That duty 
requires that so long as a union is the beneficiary of agency 
shop fee payments in amounts equal to dues paid by members, the 
union must use the funds so obtained in a manner that will accord 
to both members and agency shop fee payers an equal opportunity 
to share in substantial economic benefits furnished by the union 
with such funds. A violation of that duty is an improper practice 
within the meaning of CSL §209-a„2(a). 
UUP's conduct is clearly inconsistent with the limited pur-
pose of the agency shop legislation. That purpose is to achieve 
an equitable sharing of the union's cost of collective bargaining 
activities among all the employees who may benefit therefrom; in 
short, to eliminate the so-called "free rider". Since the monies 
paid by members and non-members to UUP are equal in amount, the 
result of diverting sums from, the general fund for the furnishing 
of insurance benefits only to members and using the remaining 
^The Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 US 248, 255, 15 LRRM 697 (1944). 
ft 
— Ryan v. New York Newspaper Printing Pressmen' Union,' Local No. 2, 
590 F2d 451, 100 LRRM 2428, 2430 (CA 2, 1979). 
-/see, e.g. , Plaihview-Old Bethpage USD, 7 PERB 1(3058 (1974); 
Nassau Ed.' Chapter of Syosset USD Unit,' C'SEA, 11 PERB 1f3010 
(1978); Social ServTcer~EmpToyees .Union," Local 371, 11 PERB 
113004 (1978)^ 
6076 
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funds for collective bargaining purposes is that non-members pay 
more for the collective bargaining services of the organization 
than members. A union cannot be permitted to make "free riders" 
of its members at the expense of non-members. 
Rights protected by statute may not be impaired by the exer-
cise of what might otherwise be legitimate internal, union 
interests. Although the Taylor Law leaves employee organizations 
free to- take action which reflects a legitimate union interest, 
it does not permit acts which invade or frustrate the overriding 
8 / policies of the Taylor Law.—' 
. . :," REMEDY 
In view of the nature of the violation found herein, a 
remedial order should be issued now. UUP's refund procedure is 
not an appropriate remedial mechanism for such violation. In 
order to effectuate the policies of the Taylor Law, UUP cannot be 
permitted to continue to expend its funds in the coercive and 
discriminatory manner found herein. Therefore, we shall direct 
UUP to cease and desist from the coercive, practice of providing 
insurance benefits through its dues payments solely to its members 
while not providing equivalent coverage and benefits to non-
members who pay the agency shop fee in an amount equivalent to 
dues. 
This direction shall, however, be subject to the proviso 
that if UUP, for any reason, determines to continue to make such 
— • _ 
— To the same- effect in the private sector, see, e.g., Automobile 
Workers (General Electric), 197 NLRB 608, 80 LRRM 1411 (1972) ; 
Carpenters' Local 22 ('Graziaho' Construction' Co.) , 195 NLRB 1, 
79 LRRM 1194 (1972)7 
6077 
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benefits available only to its members through dues payments, 
then it shall be directed to cease and desist from collecting 
from each non-member that portion of its agency shop fee which is 
equal to the per member cost of the insurance benefits. UUP shall 
furnish the State Comptroller with appropriate notice to effectu-
ate the reduction in agency fee collections. The option thus 
afforded UUP must be exercised by it no later than thirty (30) 
days after the date of this decision. 
Eson, the sole charging party in this case, should be granted 
affirmative relief. He should be recompensed to the extent of 
the discrimination. UUP should be directed to return immediately 
to Eson that portion of his agency shop fees paid to the UUP since 
the commencement of the insurance program or the commencement of 
the collection of agency shop fees from Eson, whichever was later, 
which is equal to the per member cost of the insurance benefits. 
WE, THEREFORE, ORDER THE United University Professions, Inc. 
1„ to cease and desist from providing insurance benefits 
through its dues and agency shop fee payments solely 
to its members while not providing equivalent cover-
age and benefits to non-members who pay the agency 
shop fee in an amount equivalent to dues, 'provided, 
however, that if United University Professions, Inc., 
for any reason, determines to continue to make such 
benefits available only to its members through dues 
and agency shop fee payments, then United University 
Professions, Inc. shall cease and desist from 
collecting from each non-member that 
f:mt 
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portion of its agency shop fee which is. equal to the 
per member cost of the insurance benefits and shall 
furnish the State Comptroller with appropriate 
notice to effectuate the reduction in agency fee 
collections; this paragraph to be complied with by 
UUP no later than thirty (30) days after the date of 
this order; 
2. to return, immediately to Eson that portion of his 
agency shop fees paid to the United University 
Professions, Inc. since the commencement of the 
insurance program or the commencement of the collec-
tion of agency shop fees from Eson, whichever is 
later, which is equal to the per member cost of the 
insurance benefits incurred during such period. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 13, 1979 
^r-~&*4£*£<l- Aft«?~*<^ <a^ s_ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
da/Klaus, Member 
David C„ Randies, Member 
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December 6, 1979. 36389 
In the Matter of HERBERT B. EVANS, ' 
as Chief Administrative Judge of 
the Unified Court System of the 
State of New York, Respondent, 
V . • ' 
HAROLD R. NEWHAN et al. , Individually 
and as Members of the PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONS BOARD OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 
et al. , Appellants. 
NEW YORK STATE COURT OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 
et al. , Intervenors-^Appellants. 
Judgment affirmed, without costs. 
Opinion Per Curiam. • 
SWEENEY, J. P., KANE, STALEY, JR., MIKOLL and HERLIHY, JJ., 
concur. 
' T!«. C VN'3^ 
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DEC IS SO 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
Apellate Smiston 
(Hfjirfo 3Jub trial Btpaxtmmi 
JUSTICE BUILDING' 
HON. A. FRANKLIN'MAHONEY 
Presiding Justice 
HON. LOUIS M. GREENBLOTT 
HON. MICHAEL E. SWEENEY 
HON. T. PAUL KANE • • 
HON. ELLIS J. STALEY, JR. 
HON. ROBERT G. MAIN 
HON. ANN T. MIKOLL - — 
HON. J. CLARENCE HERLIHY £>0 
O 
- • • ' ' • v D 
Associate Justices 
JOHN J. O'BRIEN 
#36389 
STATE OF NEW YORK SUPREME COURT 
APPELLATE DIVISION THIRD DEPARTMENT 
•In the Matter of HERBERT B. EVANS, j 
as Chief Administrative Judge of ] 
the Unified.Court System of the ] 
State of New York, ] 
Respondent, \ 
-against- 3 
HAROLD R. NEWMAN et al., ' ^ 
Individually and as Members of •. 
the PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS { 
BOARD OF THE STATE OF .NEW YORK, j 
et al., I 
• Appellants. 3 
NEW YORK STATE COURT OFFICERS i 
ASSOCIATION et al. , i 
Intervenors-Appellants. J 
Argued, October 15, 1979. 
Before: 
HON. MICHAEL El SWEENEY, 
Justice Presiding; 
HON. T. PAUL KANE, 
HON. ELLIS J. STALEY, JR., 
HON. ANN T. MIKOLL, 
HON. J. CLARENCE HERLIHY, 
Associate Justices. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Supreme Court at.Special Term 
(Robert C. Williams, J.), entered September 14, 1979 in Albany 
County, which, inter alia, (1) granted petitioner's application, in 
a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 7.8, to vacate that portion of 
a determination of appellant Public Employment Relations Board 
which required petitioner to negotiate allocation of positions of 
State-paid nonjudicial employees of the courts to State salary' 
grades,and (2) dismissed-the affirmative defenses asserted by appel-
lants, and intervenors-appellants. 
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MARTIN L. BARR (Anthony CagliOstro of counsel), for appellants, 
50 Wolf Road, Albany, New York 12205. 
_.__.._.. PHILLIPS, NIZER. BENJAMIN, KRIM & BALLON. (Albert H. Blumenthal 
of counsel), for New York State Court Officers Association, 
intervenor-appellant, 40 West 57th Street, New York, New York 10019. 
DRETZIN & KAUFF,- P.C. (Adam Blumenstein of counsel) , for 
James R.Hannon, intervenor-appellant, 123 East 62nd Street, New 
York, New York 10021. 
STEPHEN G. CRANE (Michael Colodner of counsel), for respondent,' 
Office of Court Administration, 270 Broadway, New York, New York 
10007. 
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Per Curiam. 
Pe t i t i one r i s the Chief Administrat ive Judge of the Unified Court 
. ^System of the S ta te of New York. Appellant Public Employment Relations 
Board (PERB) i s a S ta te Agency created pursuant to article""14 of- the 
C iv i l Service Law. In terveners-appel lants New York S t a t e Supreme 
Court Officers Associat ion, New York S ta te Court Clerks Associa t ion , 
and the Court Clerks Benevolent Associat ion (Unions) a re the j o i n t l y 
c e r t i f i e d co l l e c t i ve bargaining represen ta t ives for approximately 
2,500 court c le rks and court off icers employed by the Unified Court 
System within the City of New York. In terven or -appel lant James R, 
Hannon has appeared indiv idual ly and as President of the New York Sta te 
Supreme Court Officers Associat ion. 
On December 1, 1978, the Unions f i l e d an improper p r a c t i c e charge, 
pursuant to sec t ion 209-a of the C iv i l Service Law and Par t 204 of 
PERB's Rules, of Procedure (4 NYCRR Par t 204) , charging t h a t petition-* 
e r ' s predecessor and the Director of Employee Relations of the S t a t e 
Office of Court Administration (here inaf te r j o i n t l y OCA) l i d v io l a t ed 
t h e i r duty to nego t i a t e in good f a i t h with respec t t o var ious 
associa t ion demands, 
OCA responded t h a t the Union's demands were not mandatorily 
negot iable and, on January 3 , 1979, i t f i l e d i t s own improper p r a c t i c e 
charge, a l l eg ing tha t the Unions fa i l ed t o negot ia te in good f a i t h by 
i n s i s t i n g upon the negot ia t ion of non-mandatory s u b j e c t s . 
On August 16, 1979, a f t e r proceedings were duly had before PERB, 
PERB rendered a decision holding tha t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s pr imar i ly the 
exercise of a governmental mission and no t a mandatory subject of 
nego t i a t ion . Nevertheless , i t a l so ru led tha t the a l l o c a t i o n of 
posi t ions to sa la ry grades was a mandatory subject of nego t i a t ion . 
~
 n PERB fur ther d i rec ted t h a t both sides nego t ia te in good f a i t h . 
On August 20, 1978, p e t i t i o n e r commenced the subject a r t i c l e 78 
proceeding, seeking to vacate t ha t por t ion of PERB's determination 
which ruled tha t a l loca t ion to S ta te-pa id sa lary grades was a manda-
tory subject of nego t i a t ion . Special Term sustained the p e t i t i o n con-
- eluding tha t "[a] l locati 'on of job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s to sa la ry grades i s 
a matter which the Legis la ture has s p e c i f i c a l l y ent rus ted to the 
Administrative Board of the J u d i c i a l Conference." In .ar r iv ing a t t h i s 
r e s u l t , Special Term reasoned tha t sec t ion 39 (subd. 8) of the 
Judic iary Law was c lea r and unambiguous; t h a t the process of c o l l e c t i v e 
negot ia t ion would tend to undermine the goals sought t o be a t t a ined by 
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unification of the court system; and that unilateral allocation of 
salary grades would not deprive the unions of their rights under the 
Taylor Law (Civil Service Law, art. 14) since individual salaries 
within the salary grades will remain a subject of negotiation along 
with other terms and conditions of employment. In its decision 
Special Term_ also dismissed as premature certain, counterclaims asserted-
by the Unions„ 
Article 14 of the Civil Service Law (Taylor Law) applies to nonr 
judicial employees in the Unified Court System (McCoy v. Helsby, 34 
A D 2d 252, affd. 28 H Y 2d 790), Pursuant to article 14, an employer 
is required to negotiate terms and conditions of employment (Civil 
Service Law, § 204, subd. 2; Bd. of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. 
Ho. 3 of Town of Huntington v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 
H Y 2d 122, 127). The. phrase "'terms and conditions of.employment' 
means salaries, wages, hours, agency shop fee deduction and other 
terms and conditions of employment * * *", less certain topics not 
germaine to this appeal (Civil Service Law, § 201, subd. 4). It is an 
improper labor practice for a public employer or employee organization 
to refuse, tc negotiate in good faith (Civil Service Law, § 209-a, 
subds. 1,2). 
PERB has been granted the authority to resolve disputes arising 
out of negotiations (Civil Service Law, § 209). "Inherent in this 
delegation is the power to interpret and construe the statutory 
scheme. Such construction given by the agency charged with adminis-
tering the statute is to be accepted if not unreasonable * * * 
[citations omitted]." (Matter of West Irondeauoit Teachers Assn. v. 
Helsby, 35 K Y 2d 46, 51.) 
Unless we find legislative authority for PERB's determination 
that the allocation of positions to State salary grades relates 
primarily to terms and conditions of employment and not to the formu-
lation or management of public policy, we must affirm Special Term. 
In resolving this question, an examination of the relevant statutes, S 
legislative reports and memoranda is necessary. 
We have reviewed section 39 (subd. 6, par. [a]; subds. 7, 8) of 
the Judiciary Law, and conclude that, on its face, section 39 is not 
dispositive of the. issue. We, therefore, go further. 
60K 
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H i s t o r i c a l l y , management in the executive branch u n i l a t e r a l l y 
determined the a l loca t ion of pos i t ions to sa lary grades p r io r to the 
enactment of the Taylor Law (see Matter of Corrigan v . Joseph, 304 
N*Yt._ 1.7.2, 180-183,, where the Court of Appeals noted the c lose r e l a t i o n -
ship between c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and a l l o c a t i o n ) . 
After enactment of the Taylor Law, a l loca t ion remained outside 
the terms and conditions of employment in the executive branch. 
Section 24 of chapter 158 of the Laws of 1970,provides: 
Upon the repor t of the Se lec t Jo in t Leg i s l a t i ve 
Committee to conduct the hearing in the matter 
of the dispute between Council 82, A.F.S.C.M.E., 
and the S ta te of New York and the public hear ings 
held on the repor t of the fac t - f inding board, the 
l e g i s l a t u r e finds and declares that a l l o c a t i o n s 
and rea l loca t ions to sa la ry grades of pos i t i ons in 
the c l a s s i f i ed service of the s t a t e are not terms 
and conditions of employment under a r t i c l e fourteen 
of the c i v i l service law. The l e g i s l a t u r e fur ther 
finds and declares tha t such a l loca t ions and r e a l l o -
cat ions are not within the scope of a f ac t - f ind ing 
board but are to be accomplished exclus ive ly 
pursuant to the provisions of a r t i c l e e igh t of the 
c i v i l service law. 
Appellants and intervenors argue tha t the l e g i s l a t i v e finding in 
section 24 applies only to the executive branch of government since 
the second sentence of the section makes reference to a r t i c l e 8 of 
the Civ i l Service Law.and a r t i c l e 8 does not apply to the j u d i c i a l 
branch of government. We disagree . The Legis la ture indica ted tha t 
the two conclusions are not dependent on each other when i t employed 
the language " [ t ]he l e g i s l a t u r e fur ther finds * * *" in the second 
sentence above (emphasis added). The quoted language should be given 
meaning and we conclude, therefore , tha t the f i r s t . s t a t e d finding i s 
separate and independent from the second f inding. 
The Report of the Select Jo in t Legis la t ive Committee, upon which 
section 24 of chapter 158 is based, i s supportive of the above conclu-
s ion. This repor t* , insofar as p e r t i n e n t , s t a t e s : 
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On the major Issue of whether salary grade allo-
cation is negotiable under article 14 of the Civil 
Service Law, we are persuaded that this matter was 
not intended to be and should not be within the 
ecope of collective negotiations, nor within the 
purview of factfinders' considerations, but rather 
is exclusively controlled by Article 8 of the 
Civil Service Law which establishes the administra-
tive procedures for determining such allocations. 
Article 8 of the Civil Service Law sets out care-
fully the detailed procedure for insuring that job 
titles in the Civil Service system are allocated 
appropriately to salary grade positions, taking 
into consideration all relevant circumstances which 
bear upon job evaluation. This system is intended 
to be administered by the Director of Classifications 
and Compensation impartially and without undue 
pressures of competing interests, in order to insure 
that such job title-salary relationships shall be 
fair and equitable. In our view, it was not the 
intention of the Legislature in adopting Article 14 
of the Civil Service Law to abrogate in any fashion 
the exclusive responsibility of the Director in this 
area or to disrupt the delicate relationships among 
the thousands of job titles in the system. In 
essence, the Article 8 policy of establishing equal 
pay for equal work was not intended to be subject 
to the vicissitudes of the collective negotiations 
process. 
While the quoted report makes it clear that the Legislature was 
interested in maintaining the independent duties of the Director of 
Classifications and Compensation, it also reveals that it was 
interested to a significant degree in avoiding the disruptions of the 
delicate relationships existing among job titles which would result 
from fluctuations inherent in collective bargaining. 
mi 
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The Leg i s la tu re , in i t s statement of Leg i s l a t ive Findings and 
Purposes in enacting sect ion 39 of the Judic ia ry Lav makes c lea r t h a t , 
in addit ion to el iminat ing the burden upon loca l governments of 
financing the cou r t s , i t s goal in e s t ab l i sh ing the un i f ied court 
system was to >:,enable the a l loca t ion , of money and manpower when 
needed* * *" and to "ensure t ha t the l imited resources ava i lab le for 
courts are a l loca ted according to need and u t i l i z e d e f fec t ive ly * * *" 
(L. 1976, ch. 966, § 1 ) . 
While th i s l e g i s l a t i v e statement i s l a rge ly devoted to f i s c a l 
considerat ions , i t a l so i s concerned with a l l o c a t i o n of manpower as 
the need a r i s e s , a goal tha t would be s ign i f i can t ly hampered i f 
negot ia t ion over a l loca t ion to sa lary grades was mandatory. A 
construction incons is ten t with the purposes of the s t a t u t o r y scheme 
should be avoided. 
We note t h a t pursuant to sect ion 37 (subd. 2) of the Jud ic ia ry 
Law (formerly Judic ia ry Law,j 219), the Administrat ive Board 
u n i l a t e r a l l y determined the sa lary grade a l loca t ion for each S t a t e -
. paid nonjudicia l pos i t ion in the court system in 1972. This fac t i s 
further evidence t h a t the Legis la ture did not intend a l loca t ion to be 
negot iable , "Where the p r a c t i c a l construct ion of a s t a t u t e i s we l l -
known, the Legis la ture i s charged with knowledge and i t s f a i l u r e to 
in t e r fe re indica tes acquiescence (Engle v„ Talanico, 33 N Y 2d 237, 
242)" (Matter of He l l e r s t e in v . Assessor of Town of Is l i p , .37 N Y 2d 
1, 9, mod. on other grounds 39 N- Y 2d 920) „ 
Moreover, the Legis la ture has indicated tha t standards and 
po l ic ies concerning t i t l e s t r u c t u r e , job d e f i n i t i o n , et c e t e r a , and 
personnel p rac t i ces r e l a t i n g to non- jud ic ia l personnel are to be 
consis tent with the Civ i l Service Law (Judic iary Law, § 211, subd. 1, 
par . [ d ] , as added by L. 1978, ch. 156, § 7; former § 212, subd. 1, 
repealed by L. 1978, .ch. 156, § 6; 
Matter of Goldstein.• v . Lang, 23 A D 2d 483, 485-486 [ d i s s e n t ] , 
rev'd. upon d i ssen t ing opn. 16 N Y 2d 735). Thus, a l e g i s l a t i v e i n t en t 
to apply the pol icy finding contained in the Report of the Select Jo in t 
. Legislat ive Committee (supra) to non- jud ic i a l employees i s evident . 
Based on the findings of that repor t and on section 24 of chapter 158 
of the Laws of 1970, PEEB's argument tha t co l l e c t i ve negot ia t ion over 
a l loca t ion i s not incons is tent with the C iv i l Service Law i s without 
^ n ^ o p i t . While a r t i c l e 8 of the Civ i l Service Law does not apply to 
^-•
l
-Um-judicial emploj^ees, these employees are to be t r ea t ed cons i s t en t ly 
wi th . the Civ i l Service Law (Matter of Goldstein v . Lang, supra ) . 
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Finally, PERB's contention that application of section 24 of 
chapter 158 of the Laws of 1970 would amount to a windfall to CCA. 
since OCA is not subject to article 8 of the Civil Service Law is 
rejected. CCA has set up an appeal procedure which obviates the 
threat of a windfall to OCA. Thejmployer or employee organization 
dissatisfied with his or its members' job allocation to salary grade 
may appeal to a classification review board consisting of three 
members appointed independently by government agencies outside the 
court system. Adverse review board decisions may then be challenged 
in an article 78 judicial proceeding (see Corkum v. Bartlett, 46 W Y 
2d 424, 431), 
Allocation of positions to salary grade is primarily related to 
a "mission" of an employer and not to terms and conditions of employ-
ment, PERB was in error when it determined otherwise. 
The Unions' contention, raised in a counterclaim, that 
petitioner violated section 39 of the Judiciary Law in allocating 
union members to salary grades is without merit. The Unions alleged 
that at least 60% of their members have been "mased out" of increments 
to which they had become entitled by virtue of their existing con-
tracts. An employee would have been "maxed out" when he was slotted 
to a salary gradefthe maximum of which was below his existing salary 
when he had not already achieved the maximum salary range before 
allocation. Thus, the Unions argue, the employees, are "maxed out" 
when they cannot attain the salaries to which they were entitled 
pursuant to contracts in effect on March 31, 1977. 
We do not construe section.39 (subd. 6, par. [a]) of the 
Judiciary Law to entitle the employees who are in "maxed out" 
situations to additional increments above their allocated salary 
grade, To do so would substantially hamper effective reorganization 
of the court system by increasing overpayment disparities among 
employees and by continuing the salary anomalies which arose out of 
the local government units1 inability to finance court Operations, 
The result would be inconsistent with legislative purposes, . 
We have examined the Unions' remaining contentions and find no 
reason to disturb the ruling of Special Term as to those matters, 
•The judgment should be affirmed, without costs. 
N.Y.L.J. November 30, 1979 P. 7, Col. 5 
APPELLATE DIVISION 
SECOND DEPARTMENT 
'p'Olil'CE^ 
CITY' OR'-j 
W*" MATTER ' 1:>!! OF". '-•• 
^BENEVOLENT ASS'N.' OF 
S'YONKERS;:, INC., pet, (N.Y.S.-Public^ j',; Employment Relations Bd.'et'al., res)— "3 
.'•Proceeding pursuant to CPLR'article'*78];S 
~to review a determination of respondent',/; 
"Public .Employment Relations Board-? 
•' (T'ERB) dated Deci 8, 1978, which/'inter^ 
i/juia, held that petitioner had.violated sec- '.i 
••tion 210 (subd l)'of the Civil Service Law.:'£ 
£*• '••Petition granted,-determination annul-.' 
' 'led.'onthe law," with costs, and charges'.'' 
! dismissed.r^:v^:'..:iV">-iJ.-.'"'. V " r - : - w ^ 
i"":'Police officers of the City of'Ybnkers" l 
•-•conducted two
 ;"sick-outs7"<one"in:April,? 
r.i977; the other in June',;1977; Apparently,*; 
. nd'rcharges "were •brought-'against'-in-^' 
•'•dividual officers ' but-petitioner '• Police s 
:Benevolent'.Association -of>'the;rCityiofi; 
.^Yonkers,.Inc. (PBA) was charged with? 
f violation'of section 210. (subd.il)-of .thel j.Civil'Service'Law by counsel'to PERB; 
«pursuant to section 210 (subd3;par[c]) ofj; 
ijthe-;Civn.^Service Law.:..-.Tne'.City-;of-.' 
£;Yonkers took'no part in these.actibns:sarv 
J'-'^ fA hearing were held at which.certain^j 
^testimony was given and exhibits were in-";? 
fetroducedJ"Police IDeputy^.ChiefiSardoJ 
^testified- -that ='he;-vwent"-to".PBA;-head-J 
^quarters 'during-ttie. June '."sick'-buts'!«;to.i |-see.- how efforts vby.'PBA. officers' and^ 
JSrustees'to get the men back to work were; j.p'roce'e"ding..Former Police. Officer Cipol-j 
Klini, a former PBA officer'ahd member of;: 
f the ^executive board;;~testified ;to'his"-
lielephone efforts in both April'and June to'.' 
Iget'thejmen to returriV^"':":^^^' ' .^-. ' '^ 
!M??;Anetter'written by'^CHpdllini'^o^The;; |Herald:Statesman, ;iri'-»vhieh he 'laid' out'" 
fine brievances of the police and asked for 
^public-support, was-admitted'-intb-
^eyidence. The letter was written by Cipol-J 
giihi as'an individual; his official title was" jfadded to the letter by the newspaper and 
Kwas'-then printed in that form. Cipollini-
§tes'Ufied:.that the PBA had^not approved, 
^e'^letteric^ '.
 t',. .:'^:-5ii:%.v.Vilv.^/'';^'«-r. 
;|-?!iCThe" other relevant evidence consisted ; jjp'fjtwbrarticles published^in-The Herald1. 
r'.^tatesmani'Thev quoted certain remarks) 
v^MegedlyCmade" by PBA.preside'ntrPor-',' 
CjJ.^ri,pya.i;InJhis- testimony. Officer.'*Por-,, 
"tanova' denied, making-the statements. 
The articles-were admitted into evidence 
as. past recollection recorded when the 
-•reporter who wrote them was unable to 
--refresh his recollection. '•>• • "' -••-... 
.^ "The hearing officer recommended dis-
missal of the charges. PERB did not go 
-a long: with this recommendation. We 
; reverse on the ground that the finding of a 
-.violation of section 210 (subd 1) of the
 s 
t{-Civil Service Law was not-supported by" 
^''substantial evidence. Subdivision 1 of sec-" 
;~tibh "210," inter-alia,--prohibits a public-
s-employee organization from causing,'in-
s t igat ing, encouraging-or condoning a. 
—strike; The only evidence'on which-the 
/•.finding of' PBA • involvement "-could ;bev 
Abased was the letter-and the newspaper-' 
-'•articles. The letter-was written by Cipol- < 
.J'Jirii as an individual, He was not an o'fficer' 
•Uwho.would normally beentrusted with of-' 
.^ficial correspondence. .There" was-.no' 
vjireason why rankand file PBA-members? 
£would assume'Official approbation.v-'-v'j..-: 
i%fii-As Uo.the newspaper • articles, there", 
rf was a direct denial of the Accuracy of the'-" 
^••.quotations by the person quoted. The arti-'-
.'cles were admitted as evidence, "tut the" 
..reporter .conceded that his work was sub--
"ject to-editing which included additions 
.;.and deletions from his'articles:--- 7- .->— 
':.••;-, This is not sufficient to constitute sub-;"" 
-istantial eyidence^-^^.-;i':-'..c '"•—-X-KJ^ 
^'tiMX.V.f&Mlv.t-;-,, 
-ih''^:-
STATU OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIOf 30ARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF YONKERS, 
-and-
Employer, 
MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATION OF THE PAID FIRE 
DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF YONKERS, NEW 
YORK, INC., LOCAL 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
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Case No. C-1823 
UNIFORMED FIRE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION OF 
THE PAID FIRE DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF 
THE CITY OF YONKERS, NEW YORK, 
Intervener, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE' AND' ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
•Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in. the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Uniformed Fire Officers' 
Association of the Paid Fire Department of. the City of Yonkers, 
New York 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above namea public employer, in the unit agreed upon.by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive representa-
tive for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settle-
ment of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Lieutenants, Captains and Assistant Chiefs 
Excluded: Chief of the Fire Department and Deputy 
, Chiefs 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that .the ^ bove named public 
employer shall negotiate collectively with the Uniformed Fire 
Officers' Association of the Paid Fire Department of the City of 
Yonkers, New York, 
and enter into.a written agreement with such employee organization 
i with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
! negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
i determination or, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 14th day of December ,1379 
Albany, New York 
n&-i^e^6L ]c //£iA^>t*-&<-si 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
__S?3*W /<~£d-**USL. 
Ida KAaus, Member 
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